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The 20th century was an era of gains and losses. 
Despite overarching technological advancements, 
the world faced horrific world wars and local con-
flicts, ideological wars and collapses of empires, 
ethnic conflicts and economic crises, etc. However, 
from my point of view, the 20th century’s gloomy 
picture encapsulates the most horrific crime of hu-
manity - genocide. The twentieth century was an 
age of murder, but it is; more precisely, an age of 
politically sanctioned mass murder, of collective, 
premeditated death intended to serve the ends 
of the state. It is an age of genocide in which 60 
million men, women and children, coming from 
many different races, religions, ethnic groups, na-
tionalities and social classes, and living in many 
different countries, on most of the continents of 
the earth, have had their lives taken because the 
state thought this desirable (Smith, 1999: 3).
That is why it is a must to gauge the genocide 
phenomenon, its roots and different types. First 
I am trying to delineate genocide, give my own 
definition of this concept. Then I try to analyze the 
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(security, food, psychological recovery, etc) will make them happy, the failure 
to do so will spread gloomy environment over society. People’s desire to re-
cover from major loses and immediately achieve happiness confuses them and 
leads them to false calculations, which, unfortunately, easily nest in the minds 
of members of society, sparking an “us-them” split the in society, which would 
take them to genocidal intentions. 
Key words: genocide, loser psychology, happiness, international community
Vahram Ayvazyan: Genocide: Intent, Motivation and Types
suvremene TEME, (2012.) god. 5., br. 1.
CONTEMPORARY issues, (2012) Vol. 5, No. 1
centar za politološka istraživanja
political science research centre
www.cpi.hr
22
studies of prominent experts in genocide studies 
such as Roger W. Smith’s writings on genocide 
and genocidal intent, Scott Straus’s findings on 
Rwandan Genocide, Alexander Laban Hinton’s 
work on the genocide in Cambodia, etc. I am 
trying to contribute to their analyses by my own 
proposals and put forward my own terms for the 
types of genocides such as anti-pluralism. 
Then I posit that the Armenian Genocide (also 
called the Great Crime or Medz Yeghern in Ar-
menian) paved the way for other genocides in 
the 20th and 21st centuries. Other infamous per-
petrators of the 20th century drew excellent les-
sons from the Armenian Genocide and then ap-
plied those against their victims. The ignorance 
of Armenian victims and the forgetfulness of the 
Armenian Genocide had horrific consequences. 
That is why I am trying to convince that the role 
of international community is extremely important 
in the prevention of such crimes from happening 
again. Then I conclude the article in positive tone 
by stating that globalizing world will become safe 
and secure in the near future and we will never 
worry about genocidal hazards.  
2. Genocide: Intent and motivation
Genocide is the greatest sin that human be-
ings have committed. It is a horrible decadence 
of the human soul. Unfortunately though, we are 
witnessing genocides even in our era, the 21st 
century (Darfur, Sudan). It is a must to puzzle 
out sociopolitical circumstances that cause geno-
cides and label preventive mechanisms against 
that havoc. The role of international community in 
that endeavor is of great significance because, as 
the 20th century proves, the absence of punitive 
measures against perpetrators, the ignorance of 
victims and forgetfulness of such a crime pave the 
way for genocides to happen again. The horrific 
history of negligence of the Armenian Genocide is 
a rare glimpse into the catastrophe of the Second 
World War. Even the greatest perpetrator, Adolf 
Hitler, speaks about the ignorance of the Arme-
nians by international community:
“I have issued the command - and I’ll have 
anybody who utters but one word of criticism 
executed by a firing squad - that our war aim 
does not consist in reaching certain lines, but 
in the physical destruction of the enemy. Ac-
cordingly, I have placed my death-head forma-
tions in readiness-for the present only in the 
East - with orders to them to send to death 
mercilessly and without compassion, men, 
women, and children of Polish derivation and 
language. Only thus shall we gain the living 
space (Lebensraum) which we need. Who, 
after all, speaks today of the annihilation of 
the Armenians? (22 August, 1939)”.1 
Hitler’s speech excellently proves the Nazi 
leader’s confidence before committing such a crime.
Though there are examples of mass violence 
directed against identifiable groups dating back 
to antiquity, ‘‘genocide’’ as a term and a concept 
has a quite recent origin. Raphael Lemkin, a Jew-
ish lawyer who fled Poland after the German in-
vasion in 1939, coined the word and introduced 
it in 1944 (Lemkin, 1944: 79). He derived it from 
the Greek for tribe or nation (geno-) and the Latin 
for killing (-cide). By ‘‘genocide,’’ Lemkin meant ‘‘a 
coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of 
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves (Lemkin, 1944: 79)’’. In no small 
part due to the efforts of Lemkin himself, his new 
word soon gained currency (Power, 2002: 30-85). 
It was mentioned in the 1945 Nuremberg indict-
ment as a description of war crimes committed by 
the defendants being tried before the International 
Military Tribunal.2 In December 1946, the General 
Assembly of the newly created United Nations 
adopted a resolution that described genocide as 
‘‘a denial of the right of existence of entire human 
groups’’ that ‘‘shocks the conscience of mankind’’ 
and ‘‘affirm[ed]’’ that genocide is ‘‘crime under 
international law (The Crime of Genocide, UN 
General Assembly Resolution 96(I), 11 December 
1946: 188–89)’’. That resolution also set in mo-
tion the process that resulted in the adoption of 
the United Nations Convention on Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG) 
on 9 December 1948 (Convention on Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 
December 1948: 78 UNTS 277). Article 2 of that 
convention gives a definition to genocide: In the 
1 The text above is the English version of the German 
document handed to Louis P. Lochner in Berlin. It first ap-
peared in Lochner’s What About Germany? (1942: 1-4). 
The Nuremberg Tribunal later identified the document as 
L-3 or Exhibit USA-28. Two other versions of the same 
document appear in Appendices II and III. For the German 
original cf. Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-
1945, Series D, Volume VII, (1956: 171-172). Italics are 
mine. For more information, see Kevork B. Bardakjian’s 
Hitler and the Armenian Genocide (1985).
2 Indictment: United States of America et al. v. Hermann 
Göring et al., The Avalon Project: Nuremberg Trial Pro-
ceedings, Vol. 1 (International Military Tribunal, 1945), 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/count.htm 
(21 April 2006), para. VIII(A). The four counts in the indict-
ment charged the defendants with crimes against peace, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and conspiracy to 
commit other crimes.
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present Convention, genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group condi-
tions of life calculated to bring about its physi-
cal destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent 
births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group 
to another group. 
The Convention puts forward the importance 
of intent as an underpinning factor for the concept 
of genocide. Actually, it derives from the Conven-
tion that even there is a possibility to commit a 
genocidal act without killing anybody: in this case 
a perpetrator has an intention to do so but he fails 
in his commitment because of the lack of force, 
preventive measures and the like. Thus, intent is 
a substantive element for genocide phenomenon. 
Here we come to the crux of the intent-motivation 
dilemma. We should take into account that intent 
is not the same as motivation. A perpetrator has 
an intention to destroy a group whereas that inten-
tion can be motivated by greed, power, revenge, 
ideological beliefs, etc. A spread of these motiva-
tions in a society develops the very intent. In other 
words, intent is constant (to destroy a victim group) 
while motivations vary (covetousness, retaliation, 
ideology, etc.). Different motivations unite in intent 
and give birth to genocide. Motivations are the ra-
tionales of intent. I further my discussion on the 
genocidal intent and motivations below.
There is a series of different definitions on 
genocide concept. Bauman has something unique 
on offer: ‘Influenced by modern conceptions of 
inferior and superior races or exploited and ex-
ploiting classes, coupled with a proclivity for pow-
erful, centralized, bureaucratic states to conceive 
of grand projects of social engineering and their 
capacity to implement such policies, modern 
states have the potential to become genocidal 
“gardener states.” For the gardener state, geno-
cide is not a policy of destruction but a grand proj-
ect of construction. Recalling Arendt’s totalitarian 
everything-is-possible thesis, Bauman argues 
that the gardener state seeks to construct new 
social, economic, demographic, or political or-
ders as a landscaper plants and tends a garden. 
Just as gardens inevitably grow weeds that do 
not belong in a meticulously designed garden, so 
do new racial, national, or revolutionary systems 
contain human beings which do not belong in the 
new order. As weeds are pulled by a gardener to 
maintain the intended design and composition of 
the garden, groups of human beings who do not 
belong to the new order must be exterminated by 
the gardener state (Bauman, 1989: 66-76). For 
Alvarez, genocide is a form of ‘‘state criminality’’ 
that is underpinned by two ‘‘constructs of belief’’, 
sovereignty and nationalism (Alvarez, 2001: 57, 
59). The vast majority of authors use similar cat-
egories for the definition of genocide.
Therefore, I would put forward my own defini-
tion on genocide phenomenon. From my point of 
view, genocide is the intent to eliminate or is the 
elimination of a victimized national, ethnical, ra-
cial or religious group within society (or societies) 
motivated by perpetrator group’s “highest” insular 
sociopolitical goals, planned and labeled by the 
perpetrator group’s sociopolitical elite, performed 
by special forces (army, militia, police, etc.) that the 
perpetrator group’s elite have at their disposal and 
by the perpetrator group itself in the form of direct 
participation in massacres or in the form of inac-
tion3 during such a calamity. Here the elimination 
can mean both physical death of victim group’s 
members (i.e. killing members of the group) and 
aforementioned acts stated in the 2nd article of the 
above-stated UN Convention on Genocide (see 
above), that’s to say elimination is the ultimate 
end of the action, the means can be different. If 
we suppose that the perpetrator group’s (P) goal 
is to achieve happiness (H) and the group labels 
happiness within the confines of its members 
while rejecting any coexistence with the victim 
group (V) within the confines of the same society 
(S), we can see that P equates to H: 
H=S-V,
while P=S-V as well, so is H=S-V=P, => H=P.
This equation (H=S-V=P) is the key driving force 
for genocidal intent, as the perpetrator equates its 
happiness to the society comprised of perpetra-
tor’s members, excluding victim group.
In other words, we can call this equation (H=S-
V=P) just genocidal intent. This genocidal intent 
develops gradually in society which takes them 
[society] to a massive destruction (psychological 
and physical). People simply become blind and 
construct their ideal society based on the absence 
and withdrawal of their own neighbors from their 
lives. The reasons for the formation and further 
3 Thus, I equate inaction with participation. Inaction in a 
genocidal period is an indirect participation in genocidal 
acts.
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development of such intent can differ: they may 
depend on sociopolitical challenging circumstances, 
such as wars, economic crises and the lack of food, 
loser psychology (in a war, for instance)4 and the 
like. Since circumstances differ and sometimes it 
is difficult to gauge the sociopolitical motives and 
changes in particular place where a genocidal act 
occurred, it is extremely difficult to point out certain 
reasons and sort out certain types of genocides.
3. Types of genocide: The Armenian Genocide 
as a “good” precedent
It is evident that genocide is a broader concept, 
which involves social, political, psychological, eco-
nomic, and ethnic features in it that is why to give 
its typology is a difficult undertaking. Furthermore, 
all genocides happen in complicated conditions 
which are difficult to gauge, and sometimes take 
us to misleading points because of the lack of 
information and evidences. Despite of the afore-
mentioned complications, many authors suggest 
various types of genocides. I will try to prove that 
such types can hardly be distinguished in particu-
lar genocides and that all such types or some of 
them can be found in all genocides or in some of 
them. It is even difficult to differentiate motiva-
tions of single individuals for committing geno-
cidal crimes and participating in massacres. For 
example, Roger W. Smith, a prominent expert in 
the field, posits that the pure types of genocide 
are institutional, retributive, utilitarian, monopolistic 
and ideological (Smith, 1999: 5). 5 
I would argue that most genocides that oc-
curred during the 20th century encompasses all 
the above mentioned types except institutional one 
(Smith says the same). I would therefore stress 
that institutional genocide is a difficult concept to 
delineate as it can be truly explained as a horrible 
war tactic. As Smith notes there, the massacre of 
men, the enslavement of women and children, and, 
often, the razing of the countryside, were univer-
sal aspects of conquest: genocide was embedded 
in the very notion of warfare. As such, no explicit 
decision had to be made to commit genocide - it 
had become routinized. In part, institutional geno-
cide was motivated by the desire to create terror, 
to display one’s power and to remove the pos-
sibility of future retaliation. Smith continues that 
institutional genocide was also due to a failure of 
political imagination: genocide was a substitute 
for politics (Smith, 1999: 6). If there was no poli-
4 Actually, this is an infamous factor for developing a geno-
cidal intent in defeated societies. 
5 For other types of classification, see Dadrian, 1975: 211-
12 and Kuper, 1982: 5-9.
tics, there were no highest insular sociopolitical 
goals. There was no genocidal intent. This is the 
very confusing point of this puzzle. Moreover, it 
derives from Smith’s words that the USA commit-
ted genocide in August 1945 when US forces used 
nuclear bombs against Japan. But the USA did not 
intend to eliminate Japanese people in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki; this was a unique warfare tactic 
to defeat Japan and to force Japanese militaristic 
elite to capitulate. That is why unlike Smith I would 
eschew the term “institutional genocide” instead 
preferring the term “devastation”.
Retributive genocide can not occur as a pure 
type of genocide, but desire for revenge is found 
in any genocide. Smith argues that retribution 
may play a role in all genocide, but it does so 
mainly as a rationalization: it is a way of blaming 
the victim and that as a principal motive in geno-
cide; retribution is rare (Smith, 1999: 5). Smith 
and the vast majority of prominent experts in the 
field therefore postulate that genocide destroys 
persons most often for what they are rather than 
for anything they have done (Smith, 1999: 5). Ac-
tually, this commonly accepted division between 
“what they are” and “what they have done” is dif-
ficult to puzzle out. If they exist (they are), then 
they do something-they exist, they live. Moreover, 
there is no example of any genocide where the 
massacre of an ethnical, national, racial or reli-
gious group was motivated by only “what they 
are” philosophy. The victim (V) must have done 
something (must have been in “uneasy” coexis-
tence with perpetrator (P)). Moreover, in order to 
dehumanize the victim, perpetrator can propagate 
a false image of the victim as an enemy, spread-
ing rumors of betrayals by the victim, mentioning 
about the victim’s economic wealth and so forth. 
So, if the victim has a wealth, has a good busi-
ness, he (V) does something (bad), that is why 
it is a misleading task to differentiate between 
those two philosophies. One thing is obvious: all 
these will finally take to dehumanization. As Israel 
Charny states, dehumanization is the act of rede-
fining the victims of genocide as ‘‘not being part 
of the human species (Charny, 1982: 207)”. For 
example, during the World War I Turkish popula-
tion was blinded by its leaders that Armenians 
were rich, educated, were spies of Europe, were 
the reason for Ottoman Empire’s sufferings, that 
Armenians were helping Russian armies and the 
like which finally took Turkish society to the sta-
tion of moral decadence. Armenian Genocide is 
an excellent proof of how “what they have done” 
philosophy takes the perpetrator to the stage of 
“what they are” and it is a vindication of imprac-
ticability of those philosophies as single entities.
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I would argue that utility is one of key driving 
forces for ordinary individuals in the perpetrator’s 
group. Those ordinary men, who are taking part 
in atrocities, can be easily motivated by greed 
rather than by ideology/nationalism, retribution 
or a takeover of power. This covetousness was 
prevalent during the Armenian Genocide, Rwandan 
Genocide, etc. The basic proposition contained in 
utilitarian genocide is that some must die so that 
others can live well (Smith, 1999: 7). Utilitarian 
genocide’s roots are found in the sixteenth cen-
tury and thereafter when colonial domination and 
exploitation of indigenous people in the Americas, 
Australia, Tasmania, parts of Africa and elsewhere 
became pronounced. It has continued in the twen-
tieth century, especially in Latin America, where 
Indians have been subjected to genocidal attacks 
in the name of progress and development. Apart 
from the more sadistic aspects of this kind of de-
struction, the object has been Indian land - for 
the timber it contains, the minerals that can be 
extracted and the cattle it can feed - and, at the 
turn of the nineteenth century, Indian labor to har-
vest, under conditions of forced labor, the sap of 
the rubber tree (Smith, 1999: 7). There are a lot of 
examples of such a motivation for mass killings. 
A couple of extracts from Straus’s interviews with 
some Hutu perpetrators in prisons who explain 
why they killed Tutsi people during the genocide 
in Rwanda.
a) What was the goal? Exterminate the Tut-
sis. And then what do people get? lt was said 
that if the Tutsis were exterminated, then the 
Hutus would occupy their land (Rul-rengeri). 
b) How does one explain to oneself the killing 
of women and children? If the women and chil-
dren remained, they could claim the goods that 
had been looted (Kigali) (Straus, 2006: 164).
The Armenian Genocide is not an exception. 
A vast volume of archives is a rare glimpse into 
the key rationale of ordinary Kurdish and Turkish 
gangs who killed Armenians and looted their prop-
erty and belongings. The same applies to the era 
of Balkan wars. One source excellently points out 
that the gangs participated in public plundering 
and the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress, 
Ottoman Empire) encouraged it in order to spark 
(motivate) the participation of gangs in plundering 
and atrocities: “The internal policy that [the CUP] 
wanted to put into effect was to plunder the prop-
erty of the Christians with the aim of enriching the 
Muslims. At the same time, two different political 
considerations were merged. It was not merely 
the seizure and plundering of their property, it 
was the policy of thinning out the concentrations 
of Greeks-and it was even described as such. In 
the name of this policy of thinning out...the first 
order was [performed] by volunteer armed gangs 
(fedai ceteler) created through the government’s 
special connivance in order to throw the Greeks out 
of the country. After publicly plundering all of their 
property and goods in the villages, on the streets, 
they would be sent packing to Greece under the 
watchful eye of the police or gendarmes, who did 
not prevent this and sometimes even participated. 
Afterward they plundered the permanent and im-
movable property and possessions. Now and for 
whatever reason, this annihilation operation began 
in Edirne, and, not limiting itself to Edirne, then 
started to be implemented in a broader manner” 
(MMZC, Devre 3, ıçtima Senesi 5: 287, cited in 
Akçam, 2004: 59-157)”.6 It derives from this source 
of information that the gangs were not interested in 
politics and national values and were motivated by 
greed. Hitler also gives a huge significance to the 
land issue. Space, in his [Hitler] thinking, always 
referred to agriculturally usable land; the word is 
regularly employed in connection with the raising 
of food for the support of the population living on 
it. Hitler had no confidence in the possibility of 
increasing food production from available land. 
The struggle for existence in which the races of 
the world engaged, the basic element of life on 
earth, was fundamentally a struggle for space. 
In this struggle the stronger won, took the space, 
proliferated on that space, and then fought for ad-
ditional space. Racial vitality and spatial expan-
sion were directly related (Weinberg, 1995: 34). 
This interdependence between racial superiority 
and land issue also vindicates that all types of 
genocides, i.e. ideological and utilitarian in this 
particular example, are exercised by perpetrators 
to attract different sectors and groups of their own 
population to participate in atrocities. One can be 
interested in nationalistic values, another one can 
be motivated by greed, the third one may want to 
take revenge and so forth.
Monopolistic genocides are often character-
ized as the struggle for power. However, there is 
a close connection between monopolistic passion 
and anti-pluralism, the perpetrator group’s desire 
to get rid of the victim group: H=S-V=P. Here the 
perpetrator group struggles not only for the mo-
nopolization of power, but also for the “monopo-
lization of the society” as well. All this will finally 
take to “us-them” split in plural societies. That is 
why monopolistic genocides come to life on the 
basis of anti-pluralism. Actually, the 20th century’s 
genocides occurred in plural societies. Leo Kuper 
6 Please note that Edirne’s original, Greek name is Adrianopolis.
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labeled “plural societies” as the “structural base 
for genocide (Kuper, 1981: 57)”. Plural society 
is the very battlefield for the struggle for power 
as power can mean security for different ethni-
cal, national, racial and religious groups within 
plural society. It is apparent that one must first 
seize power and then commit genocide. Smith 
even goes further and argues that whatever the 
shape of the regime, the most frequent source of 
genocide in the twentieth century has been the 
struggle for the monopolization of power (Smith, 
1999: 7). Rummel argues, according to what he 
calls the “power principle,” that the more power 
a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily 
according to the whims and desires of the elite, 
and the more it will make war on others and mur-
der its foreign and domestic subjects. The more 
constrained the power of governments, the less it 
will be aggressive towards others (Rummel, 1994: 
1-2). Monopolizing power will let the “powerful” 
group implement its sociopolitical goals for the 
achievement of happiness (H). This axiom applies 
to the Armenian Genocide and other genocides 
as well. For example, in the summer of 1910, the 
disillusioned CUP leaders met and accepted the 
fact that the program which they had undertaken 
to unite the Empire’s various nationalities was now 
bankrupt. What they had learned in this brief pe-
riod was that “[t]he spread of nationalism among 
the subject peoples of the Empire,... ended for-
ever the ‘Ottomanist’ dream of the free, equal and 
peaceful association of peoples in a common loy-
alty to the dynastic sovereign of a multi-national, 
multi-denominational empire (Lewis, 218, cited 
in Akçam, 2004: 59-157)”. This archival material 
vindicates that besides being motivated by the 
monopolization of power, CUP leaders accepted 
a plan of monopolizing the Ottoman society and 
getting rid of victims (V). Moreover, “on July 21, 
1910, the second anniversary of the Young Turk 
Revolution, the CUP organ Tanin carried a sort 
of state of the union address by the CUP to the 
nation at large. It gave a general assessment of 
the policies of the previous two years and officially 
declared their policy of Ottomanism to be bank-
rupt. Furthermore, the CUP confessed that its 
measures to bring about the union of the different 
communities had failed, owing to the excessive 
zeal it had shown in the first two years of consti-
tutional rule. It now recognized the opposition of 
the ethnic communities to Ottomanism and would 
therefore leave them alone. The Committee [that 
is, the CUP] would continue to pursue the cause 
of unity in a different way, namely by concentrat-
ing all its energy of the material and educational 
development of the Empire, hoping thereby to 
unite all the elements through a community of 
interests (Ahmad, 84, cited in Akçam, 2004: 59-
157). CUP elite were convinced that it was impos-
sible to achieve happiness (H) in a plural, multi-
ethnic and multi-religious society, as the insular 
nationalistic passions of minorities (Armenians, 
Greeks, etc.) were the hindrances to the devel-
opment of the empire and the latter would finally 
collapse. And since it was accepted among the 
Muslim population of the empire that Christians 
were rich and educated, those (Christians) were 
considered as challengers to power and moreover 
had close ties with European Christian states, the 
empire’s exploiters. This is one of the reasons for 
which CUP leaders accepted the horrible plan to 
homogenize Anatolia and rejected any idea of co-
existence, let alone the possibility to share state 
power with Christians. They wanted to get rid of 
Armenians, Greeks, etc. The Greek Prime Minis-
ter Venizelos claimed at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence that 300.000 Greeks had been annihilated 
and that another 450.000 had escaped to Greece 
(Avcıoğlu, 1986: 1138, cited in Akçam, 2004: 146). 
Monopolistic passions and anti-pluralism thus be-
came rampant trends in Ottoman society during 
the CUP government.
The desire for power and anti-pluralism were 
prevalent in other genocides of the twentieth cen-
tury as well. As Hinton points out, “an analogous 
process of manufacturing difference may be seen 
in most modern genocides, including the one that 
took place in Cambodia. The “Who are ‘We’?” 
speech, for example, was broadcast by Phnom 
Penh domestic radio in April 1978, as the Khmer 
Rouge purges were in full swing and border ten-
sions with Vietnam were escalating. Like other 
Khmer Rouge documents, this speech attempts to 
manufacture difference by crystallizing the ‘clear 
line” between “us and the enemy.” The broadcast 
differentiates “us” and “the enemy” in terms of “po-
litical, ideological, organizational, sentimental and 
traditional views and politics.” Friends and enemies 
are distinguished by political consciousness, or 
the degree to which a person is “mindful” of the 
party “line” and “standpoint.” Group traits follow 
from this premise. “Enemy” groups, ranging from 
imperialist lackeys to the “feudal-capitalist/ land-
owning class,” are those having a strong “private 
stand.”(Hinton, 2005: 213). Similar monopolistic 
and anti-pluralistic features can be found in the 
genocide that took place in former Yugoslavia 
both during the Second World War and after the 
collapse of the socialist block. Here perpetrators 
were simultaneously struggling for the “monopo-
lization of power and monopolization of society.” 
Dulić points out that “after the invasion and dis-
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memberment of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina became part of the Independent 
State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 
NDH). The NDH was headed by the Poglavnik 
(Leader) Ante Pavelić and the Fascist Ustasha 
organization, but there were several nationally 
exclusive political and military organizations that 
fought for supremacy within its borders. Besides 
the Ustashe and their Ustasha Corps, these were 
the regular Croatian Home Guard, the German 
Wehrmacht, the Second Army of the Italian oc-
cupation forces, and the Yugoslav Army in the 
Fatherland (Jugoslovenska vojska u otadžbini, 
JVUO) under Dragoljub “Draža” Mihajlović (bet-
ter known as one of several Chetnik organiza-
tions).Although there was considerable mistrust 
between the Italians and the Ustashe on the one 
hand, and between the Germans and the JVUO 
on the other, these collective actors eventually 
joined forces in order to destroy the People’s 
Liberation Movement (Dulić, 2006: 259). All the 
combating groups were struggling for controlling 
the state power and for getting rid of other groups. 
Dulić continues that “the motives for committing 
mass killings in Yugoslavia ranged from primarily 
military objectives of acquiring control over an oc-
cupied territory in order to exploit its resources, to 
ideologically motivated killings and deportations 
that aimed at ethnically purifying territories exclu-
sively claimed by an ethnic group (Dulić, 2006: 
259)”. Ethnically purify territories means to get 
rid of other groups, in other words, monopolize 
society. Therefore this also shows how difficult it 
is to sort out certain types of genocides. The mo-
nopolistic passions and anti-pluralistic currents 
strengthened after the collapse of the socialist 
block. M. A. Hoare gives the gloomy picture of the 
former Yugoslavia in 1990s: “The second period 
of genocidal crime occurred in the 1990s, as Yu-
goslavia went through its break-up. The instances 
of genocide or related crimes included: the perse-
cution, mass killings and expulsions of Croatian 
civilians in Croatia by the reconstituted Yugoslav 
People’s Army (Jugoslovenska narodna armija, 
JNA) and Serb paramilitary forces, during their 
assault on Croatia in 1991-1992; the systematic 
persecution, mass killings and expulsion of Bos-
nian civilians (Croats, Muslims and non-nationalist 
Serbs), by the JNA, Army of the Serb Republic 
and Serb paramilitary forces during their assault 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995 (alone 
of all the war crimes committed in the former Yu-
goslavia in the 1990s, some of these war crimes 
have been ruled by the international courts to have 
been genocidal); the persecution, killing and ex-
pulsion, involving some large-scale massacres, 
of Muslim civilians by Croatian and Bosnian Croat 
forces, during their own assault on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1992-1994; the persecution and 
killing of Serb and Croat civilians by Bosnian army 
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, during their 
counteroffensives of 1992-1995; the widespread 
killings of Serb civilians by Croatian forces in both 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during their 
final counteroffensives in the summer and fall of 
1995; the systematic mass killing and expulsion 
of Albanian civilians by regular Serbian police and 
military forces in Kosovo during their campaign 
against the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlir-
imtare e Kosovës, UÇK) and the Kosovo civilian 
population in 1998–1999, which were escalated 
following the NATO intervention in 1999; and the 
large-scale reprisals against Serb civilians by the 
UÇK and Albanian civilians in Kosovo (Hoare, 
2010: 1199).7 The former Yugoslavian societal 
groups were struggling for power and for societal 
purification. They labeled their happiness without 
giving place to others in their lives.
Struggle for power and anti-pluralism in plu-
ral societies also “visited” Africa.  To understand 
how important it was for Africans to keep power 
and how “difficult” it was for them to leave their 
“powerful” posts, just a couple of reminiscences 
of African history. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
one-party and no-party states remained the norm 
throughout the 1980s, political liberalization has 
been widespread. Although progress has been 
less consistent (and usually less deep) than in 
much of Latin America, relatively open multiparty 
elections are becoming common. In March 1991, 
Benin’s Nicéphore Soglo became the first candi-
date in the history of mainland Africa to defeat 
an incumbent president in a democratic election. 
Even more dramatic was the November 1991 
7 Recent developments in the Balkans and new decisions 
by international courts raise a number of questions on the 
genocidal acts, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in the Balkans in the 1990s. On 16 November the United 
Nations Yugoslav war crimes tribunal acquitted two Croa-
tian generals of war crimes against Serbs. Ante Gotovina 
and Mladen Markač were convicted in 2011 but their suc-
cessful appeal means that no Croats have been convicted 
by the UN tribunal of any crimes against Serbs in Croatia 
during the war years. The acquittal also means that the 
tribunal has judged that there was no “joint criminal en-
terprise” designed to drive out some 200.000 Serbs from 
the Krajina region in 1995. For more information, see The 
Economist, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternap-
proaches/2012/11/croatian-serbian-relations?fsrc=scn/
tw_ec/old_wounds_new_grievances (1 December 2012). 
For more information, see The New York Times, http://www.
nytimes.com/aponline/2012/11/29/world/europe/ap-eu-war-
crimes-kosovo.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0 (29 November 
2012). However, these recent developments require further 
research and open debates on courts’ decisions. These 
topics are far beyond my research topic in this article.
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defeat of Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s president 
for the first twenty-five years of its independence 
(Donnelly, 1997: 14). Similar struggle for power, 
but with horrible results, occurred in Rwanda, 
commonly known as a plural society. However 
S. Straus argues that there was no old historical 
hatred between tribes in Rwanda. He points out: 
“First, tribe is the wrong register for describing 
Rwanda’s ethnic categories. Rwanda has three 
commonly recognized ethnic groups - Hutus, Tut-
sis, and Twas. Many debate the exact proportion 
of each, but the Hutus comprised 84-90 percent 
of Rwanda’s population before the genocide, Tut-
sis were 9-15 percent/ and Twas were 1 percent 
(Straus, 2006: 19)”. “Hutus and Tutsis speak the 
same language (Kinyarwanda) they belong to the 
same clans; they live in the same regions and, in 
most areas, the same neighborhoods; they have 
the same cultural practices and myths; and they 
have the same religions. Many also intermarry 
(Straus, 2006: 20)”. It derives from Straus’s piece 
of work that these tribes could hardly fight each 
other because of anti-pluralism only. They must 
be motivated by greed, monopolistic passions, 
retribution, etc. Straus continues: “The principles 
of the Hutu Revolution guided official policy, which 
meant that Hutus dominated the government and 
military, often to the exclusion of Tutsis. Rwanda’s 
first president, Grégoire Kayibanda, who ruled from 
1962 to 1973, was more discriminatory towards 
Tutsis than his successor. Under Kayibanda, there 
was a series of anti-Tutsi massacres in the early 
1960s and in 1973. Rwanda’s second president, 
Juvénal Habyarimana, who ruled from 1973 to 
1994, diminished anti-Tutsi discrimination. Even 
so, Habyarimana maintained strong limits on Tutsi 
advancement through a system of regional and 
ethnic quotas (Straus, 2006: 23)”.8 Here we see 
the struggle for power and the exclusion of Tutsis 
from important posts in the government. Straus’s 
interviews with Hutu perpetrators (in prisons, after 
the genocide) vindicate that the power was of great 
significance for Rwandans and that their leader 
(president) was indivisible part of their lives and 
beliefs. The president was the symbol of their 
security. Some extracts from those interviews:
When Habyarimana was killed, people said, 
“It’s over. Since they killed Habyarimana, now 
all the Hutus will be killed (Gitarama)”.
With Habyarimana’s death, I thought that Tutsis 
were the enemy…Why? Because, during the 
war, when the Inkotanyi attacked, they only 
killed Hutus. Before Habyarimana died, did 
8 On the treatment of Tutsis under Habyarimana, see New-
bury, 1992: 198-99.
you think that Tutsis were the enemy? With 
the I990 war, I began to think that Tutsis were 
the enemy because during this period I saw 
that Hutus were killed. This idea stayed in my 
head until the period when Habyarimana died. 
Could you have killed a Tutsi before the death 
of the president? No. Even if Tutsis were the 
enemy? No. Why not? With the war, I’ve heard 
that [Fred] Rwigema [the former RPF leader] 
wanted to take power and we did not think 
all Tutsis were enemies, but with the death 
of Habyarimana, we thought that we would 
be killed next. Why? With the attack [before 
1994], the elders said that they [the RPF] 
might bring back the monarchy but when the 
Inkotanyi spoke, you saw they wanted to take 
power, not bring back monarchy. Because of 
this, I had no conflict with my Tutsi neighbors, 
but all the same the idea was in my head with 
the beginning of the war. But with the death of 
Habyarimana, we saw they were the enemy…. 
We were truly affected. There was even calm. 
Nothing was heard on the hills. Everyone was 
affected. Describe your mood. I saw that my 
parents and my neighbors had no peace. 
They asked themselves, “The Tutsis will take 
power, where will we go?” (Ruhengeri) (Straus, 
2006: 156).
Respondents claim that President Habyarimana 
guaranteed their safety as the head of state, and 
they describe an affectionate relationship to the 
president. Habyarimana was their “father” or “par-
ent”. Perpetrators identified with the president as 
their own; he seemed to symbolize Hutus (Straus, 
2006: 156). Nearly two-thirds of the respondents 
claimed that the president’s assassination was 
the most important cause of the genocide. They 
gave other reasons, such as elites, “desire for 
power” and evil “satanic” forces, but the presi-
dent’s death is the top reason the respondents 
gave for the genocide (Straus, 2006: 157). Both 
the interviews and Straus’s conclusions show that 
the vast majority of Hutus killed Tutsis for the fear 
of losing power and being killed. Habyarimana 
was the psychological base for their daily lives. 
They felt unsafe after he had been assassinated.
Ideological genocides encompass all the afore-
mentioned types either, but here I would underpin 
the idea of loser psychology. The shadow of the 
ideological genocide nests in defeated societies 
which hitherto were powerful but now are ne-
glected and exploited. The veracity of this argu-
ment rests on the experience of history, such as 
the German fiasco in the World War I, Ottoman 
Empire’s defeats by European states, Russian 
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Empire and Balkan states, Cambodia’s invasion 
by the Vietnamese, the exploitation by “capital-
ists,” and the like. In order to cope with difficult 
times, people in such societies look for ideologies 
and support insane ideas, which sometimes sim-
ply lead society to schizophrenia. For example, in 
an article Gökalp wrote in 1911 for the Yeni Hayat 
journal, he claimed that “the ‘super’ men imag-
ined by the German philosopher Nietzsche are 
the Turks. They are the new men [who appear] 
every century (asir). Therefore, new life will spring 
forth from Turkishness, which is the source of all 
of their youthfulness (Ulken, 1992: 310, cited in 
Akçam, 2004: 138)”. This is a vindication of deg-
radation of the Ottoman society which felt ne-
glected and was waiting for a messianic change. 
Another example of blindness and arrogance of 
some members of society who accept things as 
they want: “Even though the Turks performed the 
earliest and greatest services to world civilization 
through their language, science and arts, there 
have been efforts - behind which lie a variety of 
purposes -to forget all of these civilized contribu-
tions and to unjustly show them as idle and in-
significant in the view of history”.9 Namık Kemal 
argued that “we can reach an understanding if the 
Christians desire our domination. It is very natu-
ral, because since we have not allowed them into 
the government, they could not possess the right 
to complain about it (Kuntay, 1949: 186, cited in 
Akçam, 2004: 75)”. And Kemal established this 
idea on a clearly racial basis: “Because there is 
both a swirl of populations and abilities within the 
Ottoman collective, the Turks, who possess excel-
lence and virtues and qualities such as ‘breadth 
of comprehension’ (vus’at-i havsala), ‘sobriety’ 
(itidal-i dem), ‘patience and calm-headedness’ 
(tahammul ve sukunet), take pride of place (Karal, 
296, cited in Akçam, 2004: 75)”. This also tries to 
prove the superiority of Turks, which is why “their 
dominance over Christians is natural”. Or “the 
Muslims did not want equality with the Christians 
because they felt the latter undeserving of the 
highest social positions that had been their private 
domain (Akçam, 2004: 81)”. Here Christians are 
called undeserving human beings. Yusuf Akçura 
wrote that “Muslims, and especially the Ottoman 
Turks, did not want to mingle and socialize with 
the Christians. Because their 600-year domination 
would legally come to an end, and thereby they 
would fall to a level of equality with the raya (pro-
tected subject peoples), whom they have grown 
accustomed to seeing as under their domination. 
9 These words were actually spoken at the opening speech 
of Turkey’s first History Conference in 1932: Yalçın Küçük, 
112, cited in Akçam, 2004: 73.
The earliest and most tangible result of this was 
that it would be necessary to take the raya into 
the bureaucracy and the army, over which the 
Turks had, until then, a monopoly. Expressed dif-
ferently, it would be necessary to enter into a field 
of endeavor which was considered by aristocrats 
as comparatively less difficult and honorable, to 
embark upon industry and commerce: two areas 
to which they were not accustomed and which they 
held in contempt (Akçura, 28, cited in Akçam, 2004: 
81)”. All these sources try to prove that Turkish 
domination over Christians was a natural thing. 
That is the splitting mechanism of “us and them,” 
and everybody is aware of the hell that this “us 
and them” road takes a society to. 
Hitler “does not lose the race”: 
“According to Hitler’s doctrine, the history of 
mankind can be understood in terms of racial 
analysis, that is, in terms of the supposed ra-
cial components of different societies. The rise 
or fall of Rome can thus be understood as the 
products of the racial purity of early and the 
racial mixture of later Roman society. The politi-
cal division of France in the age of the French 
Revolution reflects the division between the 
Romanic, that is, racially ‘Westic’ lower classes, 
and the Nordic descendants of the Franks who 
had unified and organized the country. The cul-
tural accomplishments of civilizations are the 
product of their racial composition - the great 
artists of Renaissance times were all Nordics 
whose works reflect their own appearance, 
while the monstrosities of modern art only mir-
ror the appearance of their creators. Botticelli 
must have been as slim as his famous Venus, 
Rubens must have been as corpulent as the 
figures he painted, and Picasso presumably 
had three eyes (Weinberg, 1995: 33)”. 10
Such schizophrenic perceptions finally take 
the society to another major calamity.
Similar moral-psychological degradation is vis-
ible in the former Yugoslavia during the Second 
World War. The Ustashe occasionally referred to 
a degenerated “Serbian breed” that was incapable 
of productive work (Hrvatski narod, 19 July 1941), 
and Serbs were depicted as a mortal threat to 
the Croatian nation. Mainly, Ustasha propaganda 
emphasized something of a “clash of civilization” 
with the Serbian “dregs and garbage of the Bal-
kans” (Hrvatski narod, 7 July 1941), who due to a 
10 Anyone who considers this summary an unfair satire can 
examine Schulze-Naumburg, 1928, since the illustrations 
convey its message to anyone who does not read Ger-
man.
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cultural tradition embedded in “Byzantinism” and 
Orthodox Christianity could never live in a com-
mon state with Croats.
Cambodian communists even went further and 
tried to change the language of daily communica-
tion. In Khmer language, within the family siblings 
refer and address one another based on age, with 
younger siblings called b’aun and elders bang. 
Many Cambodian parents begin to teach their 
infants to politely greet visitors and family elders 
even before the child can walk (Hinton, 2005: 188). 
However, the Khmer Rouge, impressed with com-
munist ideology, intervened in this part of life as 
well. Seng, a Kompong Cham civil servant who 
was an “old person” during Democratic Kampu-
chea, recalled:
“The Khmer Rouge created a new order of 
life and a new morality that was based on 
the peasant class. For example, their style of 
dress didn’t have color; it was [modeled after] 
the plain black clothes that farmers wore when 
working in the fields. They also governed our 
speech and created new ways of talking. For 
example, city people used to say words like 
keng (‘sleep’), nham (‘to eat’), and so forth. 
The Khmer Rouge replaced nham with [the 
peasant class word] houp and keng with [the 
peasant class word] samrak. Everyone slept/
rested (samrak) and ate houp, ‘big people’, 
‘little people’ and those having rank (bon sakti). 
In addition, we learned that we were expected 
to boast about and praise the goodness of the 
Revolutionary Organization and Communist 
Party of Kampuchea. Angkar did things be-
cause it was clairvoyant, was alert and intelli-
gent, had a brilliant party line, and [guided us 
with its] correct leadership. Thus the people 
had to speak [Angkar’s] language fluently. 
This was the way in which they controlled our 
consciousness (satiaramma) and minds (Hin-
ton, 2005: 190)”.
Seng’s comments illustrate how the Khmer 
Rouge transformed linguistic registers in accor-
dance with their communist ideology and exal-
tation of the peasant class (Hinton, 2005: 190). 
The changes were so visible in Cambodian so-
ciety that even Pol Pot was sometimes referred 
to as “elder brother number one” (bang ti muoy) 
(Hinton, 2005: 190). They (Khmer Rouge) tried 
to control everything, an abnormal desire which 
would eventually lead the society to unbearable 
sickness. Another example on how this fake ide-
ology intervenes in the lives of ordinary men and 
women in Cambodian society:
“If we stand on collectivism, even if some ob-
jective attracts us, we will have the time to con-
sider. Having thought about it, we realize that 
we are about to slide into the private; we run 
back immediately to the collective… Therefore, 
we must hasten to stand on collectivism imme-
diately. And do not stand on the dividing line. 
Stand deeply on collectivism. Get ourselves 
ready, immediately sit on collectivism’s chair. 
Scrutinize each problem. We must scrutinize 
ourselves; is there a stand on collectivism yet? 
Sometimes we say we are already standing 
on collectivism, but the result of solving the 
problem affects collectivism. There, this stand 
is not yet correct; our line of solving is not yet 
valid. We must reevaluate our-stand. Morality 
is the same. For example, if we are living with 
a woman. As time goes on, the material atmo-
sphere leads to the development of sentiment. 
If we stand on the collective, we must manage 
the solution immediately. But if we just expand 
and strengthen the management, remaining 
attached to this woman; this is a strong pri-
vate stand. A strong private stand by a certain 
point will have affected morality… And say that 
someone offered the private chair to us to sit 
in. No one gave it to us. Because the private 
chair is everywhere around us. We must look 
for the collective chair and grasp it tightly (Hin-
ton, 2005: 196)”.
That loser psychology rests on reminiscences 
of history, good days in the past versus harsh real-
ity of the present. Taner Akçam argues that “Turk-
ish national identity arose as a natural reaction to 
continual humiliation (Akçam, 2004: 67)”. Turks, 
having vivid memories of the good past, now faced 
nasty present, which spurred the establishment of 
nationalistic passions as a weapon against own 
failures. Another author points out that 
“while the Turks possessed a feeling of su-
periority [i.e. before the 19th century], they did 
not know they were Turks...The Turks began 
to understand that they were Turks only when 
they were totally engulfed with feelings of in-
feriority...Turkism means helplessness for the 
Turks...It is a forlorn and inescapable flight 
from a sense of inferiority (Kucuk, 23, cited in 
Akçam, 2004: 67)”. 
Their dominance over Christian states in Eu-
rope was now eliminated, their country hitherto 
was being exploited, European states were inter-
vening in the state’s domestic affairs and so forth. 
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Turkish society felt ignorance from the European 
and American side. In a bulletin dated 10 Janu-
ary 1917, for instance, which was issued with the 
goal of encouraging American participation in the 
war, the authors describe the Allied war aims thus:
“The Entente states are conscious that they 
have not fought for selfish aims. Above all...
they are fighting in order to preserve truth and 
humanity. The war aims of the Entente princi-
pally and necessarily include... the rescue of 
fallen peoples from the bloody tyranny of the 
Turks and the eviction from Europe of the Ot-
toman Empire, which is totally foreign to Eu-
ropean civilization (Avcıoğlu, 1981: 34, cited 
in Akçam, 2004: 71-72)”.
Turkish society, thus, was considered foreign 
to European values, so it had to be withdrawn 
from the borders of Europe. British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George always mentioned the Turks 
in a tone of disdain and loathing. In November l9l4 
he characterized them as “a cancer on humanity, 
a wound that has worked its way into the flesh of 
the earth that it has misruled”. He characterized 
a potential Turkish victory as “the torch of pillage, 
cruelty and murder... that would be carried from 
Asia to Europe.” Toward the end of the war, in a 
speech delivered on 29 June 1917, Lloyd George 
said that the Turks had turned Mesopotamia, the 
ancient cradle of civilization, into a wasteland, and 
Armenia into a graveyard, adding that the areas 
of this cradle of civilization “shall not be left to the 
incendiary and destructive brutality of the Turks 
(Avcıoğlu, 1981: 35-36, cited in Akçam, 2004: 
72)”. Turks thought that they were ignored, they 
were afraid of retaliation. They were now fragile 
and would not be able to fight Allies. That is why 
they needed a reconstruction of their society. All 
these feelings spark the creation of nationalistic 
organizations which will implement nationalistic 
projects and prove their superiority over other 
groups in their society.
“The Turkish Strength [Society] is the straight 
and strong stream which springs forth and 
flows outward from Karakurum, and floods the 
whole world with its raging torrents. It is the 
unbroken sword. It will resurrect and reinvig-
orate the power of the Turk, which in its time 
left no stronghold standing, but which is today 
fallen and dispersed. It will cause the Turk to 
proudly raise his broad and pure countenance 
anew. It will cause his sharp, undaunted eye to 
shine again, his broad chest to thrust outward 
in pride. It shall be the custodian of the Asso-
ciation, the guardian of the Hearth (Ocak), the 
defender of the Homeland, the raider of Turan! 
The iron embrace of the Turk shall surround 
the world; the world will again tremble in fear 
before this embrace”.11 
This is a call for “wake up”, encouragement for 
revenge, “proof” of the superiority of the Turkish 
nation. Turkish nationalism ignored and forgot other 
nations in the Ottoman Empire and their contri-
bution to the country’s economy. “In those days, 
meaning after 1278 (1861), when [the newspaper] 
Tasvir-i Efkâr began to be published, the obvious 
answer to the question of who constituted of the 
Ottoman nation was Turks (Akçura, 29, cited in 
Akçam, 2004: 74)”. The others in such a big mul-
tinational empire were simply excluded. Turkish 
nationalists tried to rationalize their insane actions.
“The question of the deportations was, as you 
know, an event which set the world in an up-
roar, and which caused us all to be perceived 
as murderers. Even before this was done, we 
knew that the Christian world would not stomach 
this, and would turn all their wrath and anger 
upon us because of it. [But] why have we at-
tached the title of murderer to ourselves? Why 
have we gotten involved in such an immense 
and problematic cause (dava)? These things 
were done for the sole purpose of ensuring 
the future of our homeland, which we know is 
more beloved and sacred than our own lives”.12 
This fake patriotism for them is the rationale 
for deportations and atrocities. The loser psychol-
ogy played an enormous role in the emotional 
upheaval of the German society.
“More important, perhaps, was the psycho-
logical disorganization produced by defeat. 
Unaware of the real situation, the German 
people had seen their hopes tumble from the 
vision of victory to the reality of collapse in a 
few months of 1918. After the glory of a power-
ful state, after the immense sacrifices of war, 
their world had crashed down around them 
(Weinberg, 1995: 51)”.
German people were disappointed with the harsh 
realities of their lives and started to look for the 
11 Words spoken by the Responsible Delegate (Murahhas-r 
Mes’ut) of the Turkish Strength Society, Kuzcuoğlu Tahsin 
Bey, and quoted in Zafer Toprak, 1985: 531, 533, cited in 
Akçam, 2004: 74.
12 From a speech made by Hasan Fehmi Bey at a secret 
session of the Grand National Assembly on 11 October 
1920, TBMM Gizli Celse Zabilalari, vol. I, 1985: 177, cited 
in Akçam, 2004: 150.
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messiah. The messiah came and constructed an 
“us-them” philosophy. “The most infamous instance 
of this lethal process of manufacturing difference 
occurred in Nazi Germany. Drawing on everything 
from archaeological evidence to theories of race, 
the Nazis divided the population into a hierarchy 
of bio-social types with the Aryan race at the top. 
Jews, in contrast, were placed at the bottom of the 
hierarchy and viewed as a dangerous source of 
contamination. The Nazis propagated a number of 
discriminatory policies against the Jews and other 
devalued groups. Concentration camps became 
the ultimate institution for manufacturing differ-
ence, as Jews were stripped of the last vestiges 
of their humanity (clothing, hair, names, free will), 
treated like animals (beaten, verbally abused, and 
made to perform dehumanizing acts), and forced 
to live in horrendous conditions that led to starva-
tion, disease, stealing to survive, and death. By 
subjecting Jews to such circumstances’ the Nazis 
attempted to turn them into beings who were as 
Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda proclaimed, like 
“disease”, “bacilli”, “thieves”, “lice”, “sub-humans”, 
“parasites”, and “alien bodies” (Vann Nath, 1998: 
107, cited in Hinton, 2005: 212). “And once such 
difference had been manufactured, genocide was 
made to seem like a justifiable ‘purification’ pro-
cess necessary for the protection of the health of 
the German national body (Hinton, 2005: 212)”. 
This “us-them” philosophy took the German so-
ciety to the stage of genocidal intent: H=S-V=P.
All the aforementioned examples illustrate 
the complicated nature of genocide. All types of 
genocides are interdependent and sometimes 
concomitant and genocide studies must be dealt 
with on case to case basis. I would argue here 
that the Armenian Genocide has all the above-
mentioned genocidal characteristics. Turkish 
nationalism wanted to take revenge on the Ar-
menians because from their point of view the Ot-
toman Empire was bedeviled by Armenians, by 
their ties with the Christian world, by their wealth 
and educated elite. Turkish gangs were motivated 
by greed and looted Armenian houses, churches 
and schools. Turkish elite (CUP) had monopolistic 
passions and did their best to get rid of Armenian 
presence. They could homogenize Anatolia; they 
could “solve” the Armenian Question. If we use the 
data on the Armenian population before the World 
War, we can find vindications of anti-pluralism and 
desire to get rid of Armenians. Turkish nationalism 
could deal with 2.100.000 Armenians in a “right 
way”, by sending them to the ”hell.”
The 2.100.000 Armenians in 1912 were dis-
tributed as follows:
Six provinces of Turkish Armenia 1.018.000
Peripheral areas of the six provinces 145.000
Cilicia 407.000
Western Anatolia and European 
Turkey
530.000
Source: Armenian Delegation, 1919: 44-
46, cited in Hovannisian, 1997: 235
The patriarchal statistics showed that in the 
core region, Armenians formed 38.9 percent of 
the population, with Turks 25.4 percent, and Kurds 
16.3 percent. The Christian element, which also 
included Nestorians and Greeks, formed a plurality 
of 45.2 percent (Hovannisian, 1997: 235). Turks 
were also motivated by the superiority of Turkish 
nation and considered their power and dominance 
over Armenians (and Christians) natural. Those 
characteristics were then used by other perpe-
trators in the crimes of the 20th century, including 
Holocaust, genocides in the former Yugoslavia, 
Cambodia, Rwanda, Nigeria and the like. The Ar-
menian Genocide was the “good” precedent for 
other horrors of the 20th century. The ignorance of 
the Armenian victims was the clue for other per-
petrators to commit genocidal acts without being 
afraid of punitive measures. 
4. Conclusion
I tried to give an explanation to genocide phe-
nomenon in this short article. Historical evidences 
are useful to deepen knowledge on genocide phe-
nomenon, to delineate its reasons and gauge the 
various types of that crime. I proposed my own 
definition of genocide concept, and tried to prove 
that all motivations for genocide (greed, retalia-
tion, struggle for power, anti-pluralism, ideologi-
cal constructions) are “motivated by happiness” 
as the ultimate end for their actions. CUP leaders 
constructed their happiness excluding Armenians 
and Christians from society, Nazi leaders labeled 
the German society without Jews, Cambodians 
envisaged their happy future in communist ideol-
ogy and tried to get rid of “capitalists and foreign 
enemies”, people in former Yugoslavia thought 
of a happy society of their own excluding their 
neighbors, Rwandan Hutus “realized” that they 
would be happy and safe without Tutsis, etc. I 
tried to prove that the Armenian Genocide had 
all the above mentioned characteristics for geno-
cidal types and thus became a precedent for other 
genocides of the 20th century. Last but not least, 
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punitive measures and the presence of the inter-
national community were given a great importance 
as the main hindrances to genocides. But today we 
are again facing similar problems, unfortunately.
Today’s conflicts in the Sudans, Syria and other 
hot regions of the world must be signals for the 
international community to take action and define 
preventive mechanisms and punitive measures 
in order to find ways out of political morass and 
prevent horrific havocs from happening again. 
Any perpetrator must be afraid of punishments 
by international community. International com-
munity should act as a unified body to make the 
perpetrator surrender and put a halt to crimes 
against humanity. This also applies to recognition 
of genocides, particularly the Armenian Genocide. 
Denial is the continuation of the genocide on psy-
chological basis. Up until now Turkish government 
denies the fact of genocide, which itself is already 
a vindication of the absence of unity among the 
members of international community. The inter-
national relations sometimes are equated to an-
archy. Some believed that Armenians cannot ob-
tain justice so long as they lack a nation that can 
exert political pressure at an international level. 
This belief can apply to the life of savannah. Are 
we, the human-beings, living in a huge savannah 
either? Why do we witness genocide in Sudan in 
the 21st century? It is because of a lack of will. “The 
ghosts of Rwanda”, Eric Reeves concludes, “are 
stirring ominously in Darfur (Reeves, 13 Novem-
ber 2005)”.13 What should the victims in Sudan 
do? Surrender? As Helen Fein points out, “the 
surrender of victims in genocidal situations does 
not avoid their mass murder but expedites it (Fein, 
21, cited in Dulić, 2006: 259)”. That is why it is 
of great importance to act seriously, throw away 
insular passions and prevent horrific crimes. As 
Samantha Power has argued, politicians will act 
to stop mass killing when the political cost of in-
action outweighs the risk of acting (Power, 2002: 
510-511). But our world is so interdependent now 
that inaction truly costs more than false political 
calculus. Unpunished killings can be contagious 
and harm the very international community. I am 
happy that huge progress is being made now. On 
2 July, UN member states began intense nego-
tiations (though currently unsuccessful, but with 
hope) towards the world’s first Arms Trade Treaty, 
which will seek to establish the highest possible 
common international standards for the transfer 
of conventional weapons. Achieving a compre-
hensive, robust and effective treaty will require a 
13 Unlike Rwanda (26.000 km2 and 8 million people), Darfur 
covers a huge territory (450.000 km2 and 3.5 to 4 million 
people).
delicate balancing act (Chatham House, 28 June 
2012). This treaty will hinder perpetrators from 
buying weapons and will decrease the possibili-
ties of genocides, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Though it is extremely difficult to bring 
this treaty into life, I do believe the states will take 
into account, under the pressures of globalizing 
world, the fact that the cost of peace and security 
outweighs the cost of profits from selling weapons. 
The 21st century will be the era of great changes, 
the way to a safer planet.
Further researches and proposals are neces-
sary to enrich genocide studies and make them 
available to broader sectors of international society, 
i.e. students, academics, just interested people 
who want to make a step forward in prevention of 
genocides and who want a secure planet. 
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Genocid: namjera, motivi i tipovi
VAHRAM AYVAZYAN
International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Toronto
Genocid je komplicirani društveni, politički i psihološki fenomen. Niz istraživača 
je pokazao kako su tipovi genocida međusobno isprepleteni te se ne pojavljuju u 
čistim oblicima. Ovaj članak tvrdi kako je psihologija gubitnika jedan od glavnih 
faktora za razvoj genocidne namjere u društvu. Pritisnuto grubom stvarnošću, 
društvo se osjeća poraženim i odbačenim u međunarodnoj zajednici te traži 
načina za izaći iz psihološke kaljuže. Ekstremističke strasti i pokreti počinju pre-
vladavati u takvim društvima što naposljetku ljudi dovodi do suludih uvjerenja 
koja se temelje na potrebi osvete nad drugima kako bi se potvrdila vlastita su-
periornost te na iluziji kako je pronađeno rješenje za sve probleme: ubiti druge 
te ih odstraniti iz društva. Članak također pokazuje kako je konačni cilj takve 
genocidne namjere postizanje sreće. Kapacitet društva da svojim članovima pruži 
zadovoljenje njihovih potreba (sigurnost, hrana, psihološki oporavak, itd.) učiniti 
će ljude sretnima, dok će neuspjeh proširiti tmurno ozračje u društvu. Želja ljudi 
za oporavkom od velikih poraza i trenutačnom postizanju sreće zbunjuje ih te 
dovodi do krivih procjena koje se, nažalost, lako ugnježđuju u mislima članova 
društva te potiču podjelu na „nas i njih” u društvo što potiče na genocidne namjere. 
Ključne riječi: genocid, psihologija gubitnika, sreća, međunarodna zajednica 
